Why a Dish AWS-4 Divestment Is More Complicated Than It Looks

EchoStar is facing increased FCC scrutiny over its compliance with license buildout requirements. While the ongoing inquiries could lead to several potential outcomes, one possibility is a partial spectrum divestment. Specifically, the most likely band to be reallocated is the AWS-4 band given Bloomberg’s report that they are pushing EchoStar to sell the licenses.

In this article, we provide background on this band and outline what it may look like if the FCC and Dish make a deal.

AWS-4 Today

Frequency Layout

The AWS-4 band is divided into two parts: a 10 MHz lower band paired with a 10 MHz upper band, resulting in two channels (A & B). The FCC relicensing differs from the 3GPP standard established in 2015 which Dish uses today.

Dish converted what was originally uplink spectrum in the lower frequencies into downlink spectrum for terrestrial use. The upper frequencies are part of the N66 band plan, which covers AWS-1 and AWS-3. This 20 MHz segment is dedicated to downlink only and must be paired with another band for use (referred to as supplemental downlink carrier aggregation). The lower frequencies belong to the n70 band plan that Dish currently uses.

They operate the lower AWS-4 spectrum along with the AWS-2 downlink and the unpaired portion of AWS-3, forming, in most markets, a 25 MHz downlink channel and a 15 MHz uplink channel. In a few markets, Dish only has 10 MHz for uplink as they are missing the 5 MHz channel.

Below is a Band Plan layout from Airwave Research:

Market Layout

There are 176 geographic markets in AWS-4 (licensed as a BEA), totaling 352 licenses across the entire band.

Below is a map of the BEA’s in the continental US from Airwave Research:

AWS-4 Timeline

2012: FCC Repurposing and Title 47 Modification

The FCC authorized Dish to repurpose its Mobile-Satellite Services (MSS) AWS‑4 spectrum for terrestrial mobile broadband. Dish has to meet build‑out obligations—covering 40% of the relevant population within four years. This moved the rules from part 25 (for Satellite communications) to part 27 (Miscellaneous Wireless Communications Services).

2013: Waiver Proceeding and Conditional Grant

In September 2013, the FCC sought comment on DISH’s waiver request to flip the Lower AWS-4 block (2000–2020 MHz) from uplink to downlink.

In Dec. 2013, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau issued DA 13-2409 (WT Docket 13-225), granting DISH a conditional waiver to allow either uplink or downlink use. The condition was that DISH (or an affiliate) had to ensure Auction 96 met its $1.564 billion aggregate reserve price by bidding at least that much, and later make a one-time election within 30 months.

2015: 3GPP Standardization of n70

3GPP created a new band plan, n70, combining AWS‑3 uplink (1695‑1710 MHz) with downlink consisting of AWS‑4 (2000‑2020 MHz) and the H Block (1995–2000 MHz).

2016: DISH filed its election to run Lower AWS-4 as downlink

After the waiver grant and H-Block auction, DISH filed its election on June 1, 2016 to run Lower AWS-4 as downlink.

2022: FCC Opens Compliance Proceeding to Monitor Dish Buildouts (WT 22-212)

In May 2022, the FCC’s Wireless Telecommunications Bureau opened WT Docket No. 22-212 to monitor DISH’s compliance with AWS-4/2 GHz buildout and construction-extension conditions, following commitments imposed in the T-Mobile–Sprint merger order and subsequent license modifications.

2023: Commission Grants Extension to Dish

The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB) reviewed DISH’s status report and white paper and found that DISH satisfied its band-specific 5G deployment commitments. According to the Bureau, because DISH met the band-specific milestones, they qualified for the contingent two‑year extensions of final construction milestones to June 14, 2025 for its AWS‑4, AWS H Block, and 700 MHz E Block licenses and will update ULS records and process DISH’s renewal applications.

2024: VTel Petitions WTB to Reconsider the Extension Grant, Challenging Authority and Sufficiency of EchoStar’s Justification

In October 2024, VTel Wireless filed a petition for reconsideration challenging the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau’s decision to extend EchoStar’s construction deadlines for AWS-4 (among other bands), arguing the Bureau lacked delegated authority to alter conditions set in the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger Order and that EchoStar failed to justify a waiver with particularized facts. VTel warns that the Bureau’s grant effectively created more favorable ex post auction terms, delayed reauction opportunities, and harmed roaming competition.

In subsequent comments and replies through November 2024 and into mid-2025, VTel pressed its case that the extensions unlawfully pushed final deadlines to 2028, relied on tenuous links to COVID-19, global events, and T-Mobile business decisions, and masked EchoStar’s limited use of AWS-4 spectrum.

2025: The Space Bureau opened GN Docket 25-173 to examine EchoStar’s use of 2 GHz MSS spectrum.

By 2025, questions mounted about how effectively Dish and EchoStar were using the band. The FCC’s Space Bureau opened GN Docket 25-173 to review EchoStar’s ongoing use of 2 GHz MSS spectrum, including AWS-4. In its opening filing, SpaceX argued that Dish’s use of AWS-4 and the H Block for terrestrial service is “de minimis”, estimating actual activity at only 1%–5% of what comparable adjacent-band terrestrial networks produce. EchoStar’s position is that they have fully met their buildout obligations, invested tens of billions into a nationwide 5G Open RAN network with more than 24,000 sites covering over 80% of the U.S. population, and are commercializing both terrestrial and satellite services under the AWS-4 and 2 GHz MSS licenses. They argue that the Wireless Bureau’s 2024 extensions were lawful, pro-competitive, and have been satisfied, and that any reversal or attempt to force spectrum sharing would be retroactive, unlawful, arbitrary, discriminatory, and technologically infeasible.

The Regulatory Constraint that Governs Every Scenario

When we are talking about an AWS-4 outcome, it is impossible to ignore MSS use of 2 GHz. 47 C.F.R. §27.1136 requires the AWS-4 licensees in 2000-2020 and 2180-2200 MHz to accept interference from duly authorized MSS and to protect MSS from harmful interference. In practice, this obligation has not been tested since Dish has been the sole operator of the band, but this may change.

The implication here is that entitlements are contingent. Any relicensing, resale, or shared access must maintain MSS protection or redefine where and how that protection applies. Per 47 C.F.R. §27.1136:

An AWS licensee of the 2000-2020 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz bands must accept any interference received from duly authorized mobile satellite service operations in these bands. Any such AWS licensees must protect mobile satellite service operations in these bands from harmful interference.

This situation is not static. An active FCC proceeding 25-173: Space Bureau Opens New Docket to Explore Echostar Corporation's Use of 2 GHz MSS Spectrum explores the question of whether to permit new entrants. New operators want to enter the band, including SpaceX, Omnispace, and Kepler communications.

As noted above, when other MSS entrants enter the band, Dish loses interference rights. But an irony of the MSS legal framework (in 47 CFR 25.143(b)(2)(iii)) is that it must be technically feasible to provide nationwide coverage:

“That a system proposed to operate using non-geostationary satellites be capable of providing Mobile-Satellite Service on a continuous basis throughout the fifty states, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, i.e., that at least one satellite will be visible above the horizon at an elevation angle of at least 5° at all times within the described geographic areas.”

According to many filers in the MSS proceeding (docket 25-173), this is not being fulfilled right now.

Tools Available in Modifying licenses

When it comes to breaking up spectrum licenses, there are two dimensions:

• Disaggregation: breaking up a license by frequency. For example, the PCS A block is 15 MHz but is often split up into a 5 and 10, 7.5 and 7.5, or some other configuration such that two different owners can operate in the channel block.

• Partitioning: breaking up a license by geography. This could be taking a market (e.g. BEA) and splitting it into counties. Or it could be taking a market and splitting it into two arbitrary (in FCC terminology “undefined”) shapes.

Shared access frameworks are another FCC configuration, which allow secondary use when the primary user is idle, subject to coordination and interference constraints.

Potential Outcomes

Deep dives into each scenario

The partitioning scenario starts from a simple premise. If Dish satisfied population coverage by concentrating on dense cores, the Commission can reclaim outer areas where obligations were not met while allowing Dish to retain the markets where it actually built usable service. The practical task is to convert technical coverage into a legally clean boundary. MSS spot beam precision makes this difficult. A sensible workflow is to aggregate filed coverage contours in each BEA, derive an outer service boundary, then add coordination buffers that reflect realistic propagation, clutter, and terrain. Once the technical buffer exists, the FCC could convert it into a stable legal line by snapping to counties or by defining an arbitrary shape.

Partitioning changes the buyer mix. Rural partitions tend to be more attractive to MSS operators because terrestrial value is lower and satellite value is higher. Urban partitions are more valuable to MNOs that want capacity where traffic is concentrated. The MSS protection rule in §27.1136 could be localized to support this approach. The agency could keep explicit MSS priority in the reclaimed partitions and narrow it where measurable MSS is absent, or it could define coordination triggers that turn priority on only when MSS is operating. Dish’s new partnership with MDA Space complicates a hard partition, since nationwide continuity has commercial value, but it does not preclude a settlement in which Dish keeps core metros and gives up low-density edges with defined buffers and coordination obligations.

Disaggregation is different. Selling the upper 2 GHz block at 2180 to 2200 MHz can work as supplemental downlink when aggregated with existing AWS holdings. This is attractive to the three national carriers because the upper block sits adjacent to the AWS device ecosystem and can be turned into capacity once baseband and radio support is enabled. The near-term work is not trivial. Field upgrades may be required, as n66 was relatively recently supported in devices. (iPhone first supported n66 in 2020 with iPhone 12.) Spectrum screens could limit in the low + mid screen check. For Dish, selling the upper block reduces carrier aggregation headroom and lowers aggregate downlink throughput where the company relied on that SDL, but it preserves the lower block and the n70 architecture that underpins current deployments. So in that sense, this is arguably the least disruptive to Dish.

Selling the lower block is harder. The lower 2 GHz segment is coupled to n70 in Dish’s design, and adjacent pieces like H Block and unpaired AWS-3 would be left stranded through a sale of only the lower 20 MHz. It is technically possible to craft a new SDL construct that uses the lower segment with some other anchor, but that likely requires additional 3GPP work and enough national scale to justify device updates. The engineering is feasible, yet the commercial path is longer and the buyer pool is smaller.

Implications by Stakeholder

For Dish and EchoStar, partitioning is the least destructive way to square the buildout record with continued commercial operation. The company could retain core metros, maintain its n70 architecture, and accept coordination zones and buffers at the edges. Disaggregation that sells the upper block is manageable, since it preserves the lower block and most of the current design, at the cost of reduced downlink headroom and carrier aggregation throughput. Full divestment maximizes capital raised in one shot, but it strands vendor plans, introduces long transition timelines, and invites service disruption unless a detailed handover plan is in place.

For national MNOs, partitioning offers targeted opportunities to buy dense partitions that backfill capacity where it is most needed. The engineering is straightforward because these areas already align with existing grid density, and the legal risk is lower if MSS priority is localized outside the cores. Disaggregation of the upper block is particularly attractive to buyers that can absorb an SDL extension quickly. The work is mostly about validating device support, planning baseband and radio upgrades, and passing spectrum screens. Shared frameworks are possible, but the overhead of coordination and the constraints from MSS protection make them less compelling in the near term unless the agency defines clear, automatable triggers.

For prospective MSS entrants, partitioning is the best path to acquire rural spectrum where satellite economics are strongest and interference constraints are easier to manage. Disaggregation can also work, provided the split does not preclude future uplink and downlink pairings that MSS may require, and provided power and protection limits are defined with realistic link budgets. Full divestment creates a wide opening, but it demands significant capital and carries the highest regulatory complexity. Any of these paths becomes more tractable if the Commission narrows MSS priority to places and times where service is actually provided, because that reduces the need for broad protection zones that are difficult to honor on both sides.

Conclusion

The future of AWS-4 will depend less on technical spectrum splits alone and more on how the FCC balances its statutory obligation to protect MSS with its policy objective to foster efficient terrestrial use. Partitioning, disaggregation, or full divestment are all legally available tools, but each interacts differently with the MSS protection rule, device ecosystem readiness, and Dish’s existing deployments. Partitioning provides the cleanest way to remedy unmet buildout obligations while preserving Dish’s urban networks. Disaggregation of the upper block offers an SDL extension attractive to MNOs, while lower-block disaggregation is more complex and risks stranding adjacent holdings. A full divestment remains the most disruptive and least likely option.

At the same time, the Commission must resolve the unresolved tension in the record: whether nationwide MSS service at 2 GHz is technically achievable today. If it is not, the agency may need to localize or condition MSS protection in order to make any terrestrial remedy workable. MSS entrants like SpaceX, Omnispace, and Kepler are pressing for that opening, and national MNOs will bid if the spectrum is structured in a way that integrates smoothly into existing bands.

Whether through partitioning, disaggregation, or a broader divestment, any resolution will shape the balance of satellite and terrestrial rights in the 2 GHz band for years to come and determine whether Dish retains control or new operators gain a foothold.

Learning More

This article was written with data from:

• Airwave Research (https://www.airwaveresearch.com): An all-in-one web platform for researching spectrum licensing, transactions, and valuation.

• Radar (fccradar.com): The best tool for researching FCC proceedings.

If you are interested in learning more about spectrum licensing or FCC rulemaking, get access by inquiring through the sites.